This paper examines the effects of the Federal Reserve's Term Auction Facility (TAF) on the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The particular question investigated is whether the announcements and operations of the TAF are associated with downward shifts of the LIBOR; such an association would provide one indication of the efficacy of the TAF in mitigating liquidity problems in the interbank funding market. The empirical results suggest that the TAF has helped to ease strains in this market.
Introduction
The international money markets ran into serious trouble in August 2007. The rates of inter-bank loans with maturity terms of one-month or longer rose to unusually high levels. The spread between the three-month London inter-bank offered rates (LIBOR) 1 and the federal funds rates rose from its typical level of a few basis points to about 50 basis points and ascended further to 90 basis points in September. The widened spread was largely due to a sharp increase in the liquidity risk as well as the credit risk perceived by the market players. 2 The volume of transactions in the inter-bank market declined, and borrowers reportedly often could not obtain funds at the posted rates. Since the LIBOR affects interest rates on a wide variety of loans and securities (e.g. home mortgages and corporate loans), unusually high term rates can have disruptive effects on the economy.
In the immediate response to the disruption in the money markets, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) used open market operations to maintain the effective federal funds rate (i.e., the interest rate on overnight loans of reserves between depository institutions) close to its target rate. Although the Fed succeeded in stabilizing the overnight rate, the rates on term loans among banks continued to move up, reflecting a sustained reluctance of banks to lend to each other at longer terms.
On December 12, 2007, The Federal Reserve responded to the continuing difficulty that banks faced in obtaining term funds by introducing the Term Auction Facility 1 Libor is an average interbank borrowing rate gathered and published daily by the British Bankers Association (BBA). For the U.S. dollar, the BBA assembles the interbank borrowing rates from 16 contributor panel banks at 11am, looks at the middle eight of these rates (discarding the top and bottom four) and uses these to calculate an average, which then becomes that day's BBA LIBOR rate.
2 Liquidity risk arises from uncertainty regarding a bank's cash needs and from its potential inability to borrow funds. Credit risk arises from the uncertainty of counterparty's capability to pay back a loan. An increase in those risks either leads to a higher borrowing rate for a bank or causes a bank to lose access to willing lenders.
(TAF). The TAF provides term funding
3 to eligible depository institutions in sound financial condition through periodic auctions. The total amount of the funds available at any TAF auction is announced in advance by the Federal Reserve, and the rate (known as the "stop-out rate") is set in a competitive auction process among the participating depository institutions. Those depositories with the highest bid rates receive the funds at the stop-out rate. and the bid/cover ratio (i.e., the total amount bid as a ratio of funds auctioned) ranged between 1.25 and 3.08. A summary of the first ten auctions can be found in Armantier et al. (2008) . The Fed plans to continue the TAF auctions until market conditions clearly indicate that the auctions are no longer necessary.
Did the Term Auction Facility help in reducing the liquidity risk premium in the strained money markets? This paper investigates the effects of the TAF on the London inter-bank offered rate (LIBOR). The particular question investigated is whether the announcements and operations of the TAF program are associated with negatives shifts (or jumps) of the LIBOR. The existence of such association will provide one indication of the efficacy of the TAF in helping to relieve the strains in the money 3 The term funding is secured by the same collateral that is accepted at the discount window. Complete information about the collateral is provided at http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/.
4 The minimum bid allowed in each auction is based on the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate. This rate represents the market expectation of the average federal funds rate over that month. For a more details of the TAF, see Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews (2008) .
markets. The empirical evidence presented here suggests that the TAF has helped in easing the strained conditions in money markets.
The study of the effectiveness of the TAF is part of a broader research program that contributes to a better understanding of liquidity risk premia. In theory, when all banks face uncertainty of funding risk at the same time, the liquidity risk premium is high. In this situation, term loan markets come under stress, and term interest rates may be disconnected from overnight interest rates. This disconnection between the term and overnight rates is a key challenge faced by financial markets and the economy in the recent financial turmoil. The Term Auction Facility is a new approach taken by central banks to address the problem of a high liquidity risk premium and the resulting misallocation of funds. Measuring the effects of the new facility is a crucial first step toward understanding whether the central bank has the ability to reduce the liquidity risk premium effectively as well as to gain insight into the nature of the liquidity risk premium and its cause.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the reasons for the TAF to impact on the LIBOR. Section 3 presents the main econometric test and the TAF effect. Section 4 examines the robustness of the TAF effect. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Some Theoretical Considerations
Why might the TAF be helpful in reducing the liquidity risk premium in the term interest rate? The main reason is that the TAF may alleviate banks' liquidity risk.
In the recent strained circumstances for term funding, banks experience a high degree of uncertainty about their sources for short-term funding. At the same time, banks have also experienced increased needs for short-term funding.
5 The risk involving the rate or availability of funding is high when banks face unsettled money marketsbanks rationally fear that if they need to borrow funds in the coming weeks, it might not be available to them in the market, or might be available only on unattractive conditions. When these liquidity concerns became manifest, institutions with funds to lend may be more reluctant to lend and either require higher loan rates, shorter loan terms, or might restrict lending. banks' general unwillingness to borrow through the discount window apparently made it less than fully effective in addressing banks' needs.
The TAF provides term funds to banks whose need to borrow is revealed through aggressive bidding in an auction. It reduces the uncertainty of banks' access to future 5 Many banks had committed to funding various off-balance sheet assets in the event that the entities that held those assets could not successfully fund them in short-term commercial paper markets. In many cases, banks were required to make good on their commitments to fund those assets, placing strains on their cash resources.
6 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve also extended the term of borrowing through the primary credit program to thirty days. See the announcement of this policy action at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20070817a.htm. In addition, on March 16, 2008, the Board further reduced the spread of the primary credit rate above the target federal funds rate to 25 basis points and further extended the possible term of borrowing to 90 days.
short-term funding. The TAF also provides a new future funding source to banks that currently have funds to lend, making them more willing to supply loans. The increased availability of lending by some banks may reduce the uncertainty of other banks' sources for short-term funds. It may also prevent inordinate reliance by some banks on overnight funding that may cause excess volatility in the overnight market.
These two effects of TAF-meeting banks' immediate funding demands and reassuring potential lenders of their future access to funds-should both work in the direction of reducing liquidity risks of banks, increasing transaction volumes and values, and reducing market interest rates.
Theoretical and empirical studies also suggest that direct funding provided by the central bank may reduce liquidity risk premium in private markets, especially when the markets face aggregate uncertainty in liquidity. Tirole (2006, page 526-527) has theorized that government provision of funding lessens the premium of aggregate liquidity risk. Sundaresan and Wang (2008) have shown that the funds auctioned by the Fed right before the Millennium date change (Y2K) was associated with the ease of the liquidity risk premium in the Treasury bond markets when primary dealers feared that the Y2K might cause an aggregate liquidity shortage. The auctions that the Fed conducted preceding the Y2K were similar to the auctions in the TAF.
The TAF is a tool to reduce liquidity risk in the market by improving the allocation of funds to depository institutions. Given the structure of the TAF, banks with the greatest funding needs are likely to be the most aggressive participants in the auctions.
In particular, the stop-out rate and the auction design are intended to overcome the stigma of the traditional discount window format and encourage banks to participate in the auctions.
7 The Fed stressed that "By allowing the Federal Reserve to inject term funds through a broader range of counterparties and against a broader range of 7 The auction design issues are further discussed in Armantier et al (2008) . Although the TAF is not intended to affect the aggregate amount of reserves, it is expected to lead to an improved allocation of reserves because it directly delivers funds to the healthy banks that typically rely on the wholesale money markets and promises a future funding source to the banks that can lend in the market. The improved allocation may lead to changes in banks' expectations regarding the availability of reserves in the future.
In contrast to its anticipated effects on liquidity risk, the TAF is not expected to exert large or immediate effects in reducing credit risks of bank. Credit risks are largely determined by banks' earnings and asset value. In the current situation, it is likely that changes in asset values are the driving force for the credit risk of banks.
Much of the change in banks' asset values is determined by the valuation of mortgages and related financial products. Since the valuation of mortgages is determined by the homeowners' long-term ability to pay for their debt, there is no reason to expect the TAF to affect the value of banks' mortgage and other assets. The TAF may indirectly influence banks' credit risk by providing immediate working capital, but the influence is excluded in the measurement of the TAF effect in this study. The exclusion of this influence makes the estimation of the TAF conservative.
The focus of this study is the effect of the TAF on the liquidity risk premium in the interest rates on term loans among banks. The most important short-term interest-rate index is the three-month LIBOR. Many securities, such as interest rate swaps, floating rate notes, and adjustable mortgages are tied to the three-month LIBOR.
Consequently, the interest rate investigated in this study is the three-month LIBOR.
Analyses are also performed on one-month interest rates. Since the results are similar to those of three-month LIBOR, only the later are presented for brevity.
A problem of focusing on the LIBOR is that the banks in the LIBOR panel are suspected to under-report the borrowing costs during the period of recent credit crunch.
The under-reporting should mainly affect the general level of the LIBOR and thus has little impact on the daily changes associated with the TAF announcements and operations in this study. There is indeed a sharp increase in the LIBOR on April 17
and 18, 2008, immediately after the BBA announced its intent to investigate. The sharp increase in LIBOR on those dates can cause underestimation, not overestimation, of the TAF effect in this study if those dates coincide with some TAF events.
Fortunately, there were no TAF events on or around those dates.
A Simple Econometric Test
Conceptually, an interest rate on a term loan contains four major components-the expected average overnight risk-free interest rate, the term premium, the credit risk premium, and the liquidity risk premium. The term premium three-month LIBOR is believed to be small, while the credit and liquidity risks have become the most important driving forces of the inter-bank rates since August 2007 (Michaud and Upper, 2008) .
To examine the effect of the TAF programs on the credit and liquidity risk premium on a term loan, the overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate over the same term can be subtracted from the interest rate of the term loan. An overnight indexed swap Since the LIBOR-OIS spread contains the credit risk premium, a component that the TAF is not designed to affect, a statistical test that measures the TAF effect on the LIBOR must control for the variation of the credit risk premium. The typical approach is to include a proxy of the credit risk in the regressions. The task of this study is to test whether the TAF announcements and operations affect the three-month LIBOR-OIS spread. In efficient markets, news releases can 8 A potential issue is that the credit and liquidity premiums are positively correlated. This correlation may cause underestimation of the TAF effect on the liquidity premium. Therefore, the TAF effect reported in this study should be regarded as a conservative estimate. Instead, it must be the change of the spread.
The change in the LIBOR-OIS spread, measured in basis points, is assumed linearly associated with the TAF indicators, as well as the lag of the spread and the proxy of the credit risk. The exact econometric specification is In the regression of the LIBOR-OIS spread, the coefficients of the control variables turn out to be as expected. The change in the CDS spread has a positive and significant coefficient, consistent with the hypothesis that credit risk explains a substantial part of the elevated LIBOR-OIS spread. The lag of the LIBOR-OIS spread is insignificant coefficient, suggesting that the level of the LIBOR-OIS spread is likely to be non-stationary. Therefore, the level of the spread should not be used as a dependent variable in the regression for detecting the TAF effect.
The TAF announcements and operations may have different effects on LIBOR. To distinguish the two effects, the indicator of the TAF announcements and the indicator of the TAF operations enter the regression as separate independent variables:
If the TAF announcements or operations are helpful in reducing the term borrowing rates, at least one of the coefficients α ANN and α OPS should be negative. The result of regression (2) is reported in panel A of Table 2 ).
The TAF announcements can be split into two types, those about international central bank participation and those about domestic supply of funds, as shown in 
In regression (3), the estimates of α Table 2 ). The cumulative effect of the international TAF announcements is −8.6 basis point, only slightly smaller than the cumulative effect (−11.5 basis points) of the domestic announcements (panel B of Table 2 ). This result suggests that both international central bank coordination and the domestic program are important to banks in the market. The importance of the international coordination might reflect the dependence on wholesale funding markets by the banks that do not have extensive branch operations in the U.S. to raise deposits but hold U.S. dollar-denominated assets.
The TAF operations consist of three parts: setting the auction conditions, conducting the auctions, and notifying the auction results, as shown in of each part can be tested in the following regression:
The estimated coefficients for the three types of operations are −0.96, −0.51, and −1.18, respectively (panel A of Table 2 ). The negative coefficients support the view that each part of the TAF operation helps in reducing the liquidity risk premium in the LIBOR. Based on the estimated cumulative effects (panel B of Table 2 ), notification of an auction result seems to be the most important among the three types of operations. Although all the three coefficients are negative, they are not significant at a conventional confidence level. Since much of the operations are expected, identification of the operation effects is difficult in regression (4) as the simple econometric model does not precisely measure the evolution of expectations.
Robustness of the TAF Effect
A natural question is whether the TAF effect detected in the simple econometric tests is robust after controlling for additional factors that drive the changes of the threemonth LIBOR. Three additional factors are considered. First, the term premium is ignored in the simple econometric tests, but it can be important. To control for the term premium, the change of the spread between 5-year and 2-year Treasury yields, 10 denoted by x TRM , is added as an independent variable in the regression.
Second, the variation of the risk environment in the general financial markets may also drive the LIBOR to change. To control for the variation of risk and risk aversion in the general markets, the change of the VIX index, denoted by x RSK , is added as an independent variable. Third, short-term interest rates are well known to spike on quarter ends, when institutions report balance sheets. An indicator, denoted by x QRT , is constructed to capture the potential quarter-end effects. This indicator equals one on three days before a quarter-end to capture the positive changes and equals zero on three days after the quarter-end to capture the negative changes. 11 Incorporation of these additional control variables leads to the following expanded regression (5) Table 3 , all the TAFrelated coefficients have magnitudes and significance levels similar to those obtained from the simple specification.
Instead of serving as a control variable in the regression, the CDS prices allow the separation of the non-credit risk component from the LIBOR-OIS spread. For this purpose, the credit risk premium can be estimated from the CDS prices on the debts of the banks and subtracted from the LIBOR-OIS spread.
12 The price of a CDS on a bank can be used to estimate the credit risk premium in the LIBOR. A valuation method similar to Hull and White (2003) can be used for calculating the implied default intensity. The calculated default probability implies the credit risk premium on a three-month loan. 13 The daily time series of the average estimated credit premiums of banks is denoted by S CRD t . The credit premium in the LIBOR is 12 A similar approach in separating the non-credit component out of the term rates was employed by the Bank of England (2008) to study the behavior of the LIBOR in 2007.
13 The calculation of the credit risk premium from default probability requires an assumption about the recovery rate of the inter-bank loans. Although the recovery rate of the unsecured corporate debt under each CDS contract is provided by Markit (usually around 40%), there is no available data on the recovery rate of the inter-bank loans. Since the inter-bank loans are usually senior claims than unsecured corporate debts, the former should have higher recovery rate than the latter. Based on Table 3 in Kuritzkes, Schuermann and Weiner (2005) , the U.S. banks with at least $5 billion assets have a recovery rate of around 91.25% for unsecured deposit. Therefore, the recovery rate of the inter-bank loans is set to 91.25% for the calculation in this study. In fact, the level of the recovery rate does not affect the empirical results because the statistical tests in this study are based on the changes (not the level) of the premiums. different from X CDS t , the CDS index of banks, for the following reasons. First, the term of the default risk in LIBOR is three-months, whereas the term of the default risk in the CDS index of banks is more than two years. Second, the recovery rate of dollar deposits is substantially higher than the recovery rate of corporate debts.
Therefore, the changes of S 
where
The results of regression (6) and its variations are reported in Table 4 . Again, all the TAF-related coefficients have magnitudes and significance similar to those obtained from the simple specifications, underscoring the robustness of the empirical results discussed in the previous section.
To further check for robustness, the regressions are repeated with a sub-sample of Table 5 . The coefficients of the indicators of the TAF announcements and operations are negative and mostly significant. Therefore, the effect on the LIBOR-OIS spread remains after excluding the effect of later facilities.
Concluding Remarks
This study offers evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the TAF relieved strains in inter-bank money markets. In the LIBOR-OIS spread, a cumulative reduction of more than 50 basis points can be associated with the TAF announcements and its The results produced in this study are in sharp contrast to that reported by Taylor and William (2008) , who conclude that the TAF has no effect at all in reducing the three-month LIBOR-OIS spread. Using an indicator of the TAF auction dates to detect the TAF effects, they find that the coefficient of the TAF auction indicator is positive and insignificant. The likely reason for their result is the use of the level (not the changes) of the LIBOR-OIS spread as the dependent variable in their regressions.
As discussed in Section 3, the econometric specification with the level of the spread is valid only under the assumption that the effect of an auction disappears immediately after the auction. When the change, rather than the level, of the LIBOR-OIS spread is used as the dependent variable in Taylor The table shows results from a regression of changes in the three-month LIBOR-OIS spread on the indicators of the TAF announcements and operations. ANN is the indicator of all announcement dates. ANI is the indicator of the announcements of international central bank participation. AND is the indicator of the announcements without international central bank participation. CON is the indicator of the dates setting the conditions of the auctions. AUC is the indicator of the auction dates. NOT is the indicator of the dates when auction results are notified. OPS is the union of CON, AUC and NOT. TAF is the union of ANN and OPS. CRD is the change of the average bank CDS index constructed by J.P. Morgan Chase. The cumulative effect of an indicator is the product of its coefficient and the sum of the indicator over time. The table shows results from a regression of changes in the three-month LIBOR-OIS spread on the indicators of the TAF announcements and operations. ANN is the indicator of all announcement dates. ANI is the indicator of the announcements of international central bank participation. AND is the indicator of the announcements without international central bank participation. CON is the indicator of the dates setting the conditions of the auctions. AUC is the indicator of the auction dates.
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